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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT WILLIAM LABRUM,
Petitioner,
Case No. 920222
Priority No. 13

vs.
UTAH STATE BOARD OF
PARDONS, et al.,
Respondents.

REPLY AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
OF UTAH STATE PRISON INMATES

This Brief is written in response to the brief of Respondents
filed November 16, 1992. While it is specifically filed on behalf
of the named inmates who appear as amicus curiae, this brief
essentially represents the position of every inmate in the Utah
State Prison system who must at one time or another appear before
the Utah State Board of Pardons.
The Brief of Respondents is basically broken into five
divisions.

First, Respondents attack the particular facts and

circumstances of petitioner Robert William Labrum and contend that
this matter is not properly before this Court because of the
procedures below.

Second, Respondents argue that the Foote

decision of this Court is incorrect and that sentencing due
process rights should not apply to Utah State Prison inmates in
parole proceedings.

Third, Respondents contend that minimal due

process rights should be imposed upon the Board of Pardons if it
is not a sentencing body.

Fourth, Respondents argue that this
-1-

Court, in any event, is an improper forum for such a determination
to be made and that the matter should be remanded to a lower court
for hearing.

Finally, Respondents argue as to the due process

specifics of attorney representation, access to files, and
evidentiary hearings.
For the convenience of this Court and the parties these
answering amicus curiae will refer to the arguments made by
Respondents in the same sequence as they are raised in their
Brief.

This method will allow this Court to more easily focus

upon the arguments and counter-arguments being raised.
Before proceeding, however, it should be noted that the
respondents have seemingly failed to specifically address the
arguments contained in the opening Brief of these amicus curiae or
that filed by the public defender.

Not a single page reference to

either brief is contained in the respondents' Brief.

Numerous

arguments made by these amicus curiae have therefore not been
addressed whatsoever in the respondents' Brief while, on the other
hand, arguments not raised by any party or amicus curiae are
addressed by the respondents.

These specific additions and

omissions will be discussed in the appropriate area of the
Argument portion of this Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT MAY PROCEDURALLY ADDRESS THE
ISSUE OF PAROLE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN
SPITE OF RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENTS TO THE
CONTRARY.
Respondents cite numerous factual allegations in their
"Statement of the Case" which apply specifically to petitioner

Robert Labrum.

(Respondents' Brief, 7-9). These amicus curiae

are without sufficient information to address these assertions.
It is believed, however, that these same arguments were raised and
rejected by a panel of this Court on June 1, 1992.
Next, Respondents state that "the case should be brought
under 65B(c), "Wrongful Restraint on Personal Liberty and Habeas
Corpus Relief." (Respondents' Brief, 10). This assertion is made
because petitioner Labrum "requests the Board to rehear his case
based on alleged procedural deficiencies at a November 1987
hearing." (Id.).

Although this statement is true, Petitioner

also requested this Court to direct the Board of Pardons to
disclose its entire file to Petitioner and to give Petitioner a
reasonable opportunity to rebut any misinformation in its file.
As such, therefore, Petitioner has correctly filed an
extraordinary writ asking this Court to order corrective action
of a state agency.
The case of Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734
(Utah 1991) upon which this case is based, was originally brought
as an extraordinary writ proceeding requesting mandamus by this
Court.

In addition to this Court's approval of such procedural

device, other state courts have also approved the use of mandamus
to review the constitutional procedures of state parole systems.
For example, the Indiana Supreme Court in Murphy v. Indiana
Parole Board, 397 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ind. 1979) stated the
following:
It is true that there is no right to an appeal, in
the usual sense, from the decision of the Parole Board,
but Due Process requires that judicial review be
available to insure that the requirements of Due Process

have been met and that the Parole Board has acted within
the scope of its powers•
See also Donnell v. Commonwealth, 434 A.2d 846 (Pa.

1981);

Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 468 P.2d 350 (Nev. 1970).
It should also be noted that mandamus is a broader remedy
than is habeas corpus. Mandamus can be utilized to make sweeping
changes in the procedures of a governmental agency.

See e.g.,

Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah App.

1988).

Habeas Corpus actions, on the other hand, concern specific liberty
interests of an individual and concern the facts and circumstances
of his or her particular case rather than correction of the system
as a whole.

For example, the normal defendant in a habeas corpus

action is the prisoner's custodian.

The Board of Pardons is an

additional party if parole proceedures are disputed.
Per Veur, 824 P.2d 1200 (Utah App.

1992).

Estes v. Van

For these reasons,

therefore, the procedural context of this case is proper.
Based upon their erroneous argument that this matter must be
characterized as habeas corpus, Respondents next contend that any
such action is barred by Section 78-12-31.1, U.C.A. which requires
that a habeas corpus action must be commenced within three months
from the time the petitioner knows of grounds for relief or should
have known of such grounds.

(Respondents' Brief, 11-12).

Of

course , this argument is inapplicable since a petition for
extraordinary writ does not have such a time limitation.

However,

if this statute is deemed applicable to this litigation then the
statute itself must be held unconstitutional.

Both the United

States Constitution and the Utah Constitution provide that the
"privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended."

Article 1, Section 9; Article 1, Section 5.

The statute relied

upon by the state would clearly suspend the writ of habeas corpus
after the three month period had expired even though a petitioner
has a meritorious constitutional claim.

Moreover, in some

instances a prisoner is unable to procedurally file a writ of
habeas corpus regardless of his knowledge because of other
requirements such as in cases where his direct appeal has not
yet been decided.

Thus, the state's effort to procedurally

eliminate this appeal must fail.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN FOOTE
IS CORRECT AND THE ARGUMENTS NOW ASSERTED
BY RESPONDENTS ATTEMPT TO PUT FORM OVER
SUBSTANCE IN MAINTAINING THAT THE BOARD
OF PARDONS DOES NOT DETERMINE THE LIBERTY
INTEREST OF A PRISON INMATE.
Respondents devote a great deal of space in their brief to an
attack upon this Court's decision in Foote v. Utah Board of
Pardons.

(Respondents' Brief, 13-30).

Apparently, Respondents

want a second "bite at the apple" in an effort to decimate or
seriously weaken this Court's opinion in Foote.

These amicus

curiae welcome the opportunity to address the arguments now being
made by the State since there is no question but that this Court
was absolutely correct in its analysis and conclusions reached in
the Foote decision.
The State vigorously argues that the Board of Pardons is not
a sentencing body and relies upon numerous statutory citations and
case decisions to support its assertion.
13-17).

(Respondents' Brief,

The respondents argue that the term "sentencing" must be

strictly construed and that it must only refer to the process in

which a judge imposes a range of years to a convicted defendant.
Respondents argue that "parole is merely a rehabilitation tool,
not a part of the criminal process" and that it does not "have
authority to enhance or modify a sentence imposed by a trial
court." (Respondents' Brief, 15-16).

These arguments are

completely without merit.
If the only power of the Board of Pardons was, as a matter of
grace, to allow the early release of an inmate who was serving a
definite number of years, then the arguments of Respondents would
have some validity.

In such a case, it can be argued that the

trial court has set the maximum number of years of incarceration
that a defendant will serve, and absent the express intervention
of the Board of Pardons, the defendant will serve the entire term.
Here, on the other hand, no such situation exists.

The sentencing

court establishes a range of years the defendant may be
incarcerated.

Whether a defendant serves one year or 15 years

requires the affirmative action of the Board of Pardons.

The

Board thus has complete control over the liberty of the inmate
during the entire range of sentence.

In essence, therefore, the

Utah system of sentencing is a two-stage process in which the
judge establishes a range and the Board of Pardons establishes the
exact parole date.

Respondents themselves note, "the Board's role

is to determine the physical conditions under which the offender's
sentence is to be served, via prison or on parole." (Respondents'
Brief, 16).
This same "form over substance" argument was raised by the
U.S. government in Williams v. Turner, 702 F.Supp.

-6-
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(D.Mo. 1988).

In that case the defendant was sentenced to a

determinate term of ten years incarceration.

However, the Federal

Board of Pardons in following its matrix guidelines would normally
parole such an individual between 24 and 36 months.
The defendant was required to give testimony against another
prisoner in an ancillary proceeding and based upon such testimony
the Federal Board ordered that he serve a total of 80 months. The
government argued that the petitioner suffered no penalty as a
result of his testimony and was not entitled to assert a liberty
interest giving rise to due process.

The Federal District Court

rejected this argument and stated:
However, does one whose presumed parole date is
pushed beyond that recommended by the sentencing
guidelines, due to considerations of compelled
testimony, "suffer no penalty?" The respondents maintain
that no penalty is suffered since the Commission's
action "did not result in a new sentence or an enhanced
sentence; petitioner's sentence remained ten years."....
The petitioner states that such reasoning places form
before substance because though "the mathematical term
of petitioner's sentence (10 years) is not lengthened,
the term of confinement is clearly lenghtened."....
The Court concludes that a penalty is suffered
because a liberty interest is involved. A substantial
liberty from legal restraint is at stake any time the
government makes decisions regarding parole or
probation. Liberty from bodily restraint always had
been recognized as the core of the liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
government actions. Ingrahm v. Wright, 403 U.S.
651 (1977). Id^ at 1445.
It is equally absurd to argue that constitutional sentencing
protections should be afforded to a defendant when a court imposes
a sentence of five years to life but should not be imposed upon
the Board of Pardons when the term "life" is actually converted
into a fixed number of years.

It is clearly the liberty interest

-7-

of the inmate during his incarceration which this Court in Foote
wished to protect in stating that the Board of Pardons does
participate in the sentencing process.
The respondents have similarly twisted their discussion of
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
22-23).

471 (1972).

(Respondents1 Brief,

Respondents attempt to use the Morrissey decision to

argue that the establishment of a parole date is not a part of the
criminal process.

In fact, however, the Morrissey decision did

not in any way addressed Iowa's indeterminate sentencing system
but instead was solely directed to parole revocation proceedings.
As to those proceedings the Court clearly found that due process
protections applied.

The Court held that the liberty of a parolee

who is in the community includes many of the core values of
unqualified liberty and that its termination inflicts a "grievous
loss" on the parolee and often on others.

"By whatever name, the

liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
process, however informal."

Its termination calls for some orderly
408 U.S. at 482.

The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Greenholtz v.
Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) and Board of
Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987) clearly establish that this
"liberty" interest requires protection in cases not involving
revocation but in those in which the original parole is being
determined.
In its efforts to argue that the Board of Pardons does not
act as a sentencing body the respondents state, "Offenders who
have committed similar crimes, regardless of the district in

-a-

which the crime was committed or the sentencing court, receive
more uniform terms of incarceration when the releasing authority
has a broader picture of the crimes committed throughout the
state." (Respondents' Brief, 25). In other words, Respondents
maintain that the Board of Pardons is able to impose equal
sentences to equal criminal conduct because of the indeterminate
sentencing procedure now being utilized.
In the Federal system, this same argument has been advanced
both under the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 1976
and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Under the former, the
United States Parole Commission was required by statute to
promulgate guidelines for the exercise of its parole power.
"These guidelines are meant to reduce the disparity in treatment
of similarly situated inmates by providing 'a fundamental gauge by
which parole determinations are made.1" H.R.
838, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
and Admin.

Conf.

Rep. No.

26, reprinted in 1976 U.S.

News, 335, 359.

Code Cong,

Congress thus intended that the

guidelines "serve as a national parole policy which seeks to
achieve both equality between individual cases and a uniform
measure of justice." Id.

A number of Federal courts have held

that the guideline formulation for uniformity creates a liberty
interest requiring application of due process of law.
Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522 (8th Cir.
F.2d 282 (7th Cir.
(D.

Mo.

Evans v.

1981); Solomon v. Elsea, 676

1982); Williams v. Turner, 702 F.Supp.

1988); Dixon v. Hadden, 550 F.Supp.

157 (D.Colo.

1982).
Likewise, one of the principal reasons for enacting the

-Q-
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Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was to create a new system
of judge-ordered determinate sentences to be imposed solely upon
sentencing guidelines, to establish uniformity throughout the
country, and to abolish the concept of parole.
816 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.

1987).

Romano v. Luther,

Due process requirements clearly

are applicable in all federal sentencing procedures under the new
law.
Thus, the argument made by Respondents that the Board of
Pardons allows uniform sentencing to occur throughout the state
actually supports the concept that the Board is acting as a super
sentencing authority.
In summary, this Court's statement in Foote that the Board
of Pardons "performs a function analogous to that of the trial
judge in jurisdictions that have a determinate sentencing scheme"
is absolutely correct and the statutory, historical, and policy
arguments made by the respondents do not alter this conclusion.
The State has conceded that if the Board of Pardons is deemed
a sentencing body the same protections applicable to a trial court
sentencing procedure are also applicable here.

(Respondents'

Brief, 25). Since this is clearly the case, the rights of
counsel, access to reliable information, calling of witnesses, and
other inherent rights of sentencing must be applied to parole
hearings in order to satisfy due process and equal protection.
POINT III
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE BOARD
OF PARDONS DOES NOT FUNCTION AS A
SENTENCING BODY, INMATES ARE NEVERTHELESS
ENTITLED TO SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS.

Again, the respondents' attempt to relitigate the issues
originally raised in Foote.

After summarizing various federal

cases concerning liberty interests, the respondents conclude, "It
is obvious that the Federal Constitution does not require any
procedural due process at parole hearings before the Utah Board of
Pardons.

(Respondents1 Brief, 26-29).

While these amicus curiae

acknowledge the hornbook law recited by the respondents they do
not acknowledge the conclusion drawn by them.
The Federal law is clear that official statutes or official
regulations are not the only source of a liberty interest.

A

protected Federal liberty interest may also arise when
"particularized standards or criteria guide the state decision
makers." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
Lucas v. Hodges, 730 F.2d 1493 (D.C.

238 (1983).
Cir.

In

1984) the court

held that official statements of prison policy contained in
internal directives of officials at the District of Columbia
Detention Facility could give rise to a liberty interest even
though the statements were not promulgated under the
Administrative Procedure Act or published in the District of
Columbia Register.

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

in Walker v. Hughes, 568 F.2d 1247, 1254-56 (6th Cir.

1977)

found a liberty interest in policy statements issued by the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Warden of a Federal institution
even though neither had been promulgated under the Administrative
Procedure standards or published in the Federal Register.
In Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1291 (6th Cir.

1980)

the Court held that a liberty interest was established by a prison

rule contained in a "Adult Service Policies and Procedure Manual
of the Department of Correction Guideline," The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 785 (10th Cir.
1980) found a protected liberty interest in the "Official
Statement of Policy" issued by the administrator of one Colorado
penetentiary.

Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that a

liberty interest may be created by "intra and inter-institutional
directives containing guidelines for allowing and denying
compensatory good time." Arsberry v. Sielaff, 586 F.2d 37, 47
(7th Cir. 1978).
In a concurring opinion Justice Brennan stated that to show a
federally protected liberty interest "respondents must show—by
reference to statute, regulation, administrative practice,
contractual arrangements or other mutual understandings—that
particularized standards or criteria guides the state decision
makers." Connecticutt Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S.
458, 467 (Brennan, J., concurring).

See also Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460 where Justice Stephens stated, "It does not
matter whether the state uses a particular form of words in its
laws or regulations, or indeed whether it has adopted written
rules at all."

Id. at 486 n. 12.

These amicus curiae contend that the Sentencing Guidelines
now utilized in this state by both judges and the Board of Pardons
creates an expectation which gives rise to a federal liberty
interest.

These guidelines were created by the Utah Commission of

Criminal and Juvenile Justice which consisted of judges,
administrators and lawyers from all facets of the criminal and

corrective law system.

These guidelines are utilized by a

defendant's attorney in advising a defendant whether to plead
guilty or not, are used by probation officers in preparing
presentence reports, are used by sentencing judges in determining
the type of sentence to be imposed, are used by prison screening
officials in determining where to place an inmate for
incarceration, and are used by the Board of Pardons to evaluate
the time an inmate should be incarcerated.

Thus, even under the

conservative due process analysis by the majority opinion in
Greenholtz the Utah Sentencing Guidelines create a type of
expectancy which gives rise to a federally protected liberty
interest.
The question of federal due process rights as it relates to
the Utah Parole System, however, is essentially moot since this
Court in Foote did not find it necessary to analyze federal
standards in light of the clear Utah State constitutional mandate
and in light of the differing types of prison systems existing in
the Federal and state jurisdiction.

Thus, unless this Court

desires to make a federal constitutional law analysis based upon
the sentencing guidelines as stated above, this Court is free to
evaluate state due process free from any federal court decisions.
Respondents assert that under this Court's decision in Foote,
"Apparently, the Utah Constitution no longer requires a legitimate
expectation under its due process clause." (Respondents' Brief,
29).

This analysis by Respondents is clearly incorrect.

The

Court in Foote found that the Utah system of indeterminate
sentencing created a continuing liberty interest both in the trial

court and before the Board of Pardons.

The intent of the framers

of the Utah State Constitution was to provide due process
protection whenever liberty in the form of incarceration had been
jeopardized.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in
Tasker v. Mohn, 267 S.E.2d 183 (W.Va.

1980) criticized the

majority opinion in Greenholtz as based upon an unrealistic
distinction in allowing due process rights to apply to parole
revocation hearings but not to original parole hearings.

The

Court stated:
The problem that the Supreme Court majority has is
whether expectation of parole release is co-extensive
with the liberty interest in staying on parole. It
doubts the legitimacy of the expectation of parole. If
the expectation represents a statutory entitlement, it
recognizes that due process is required....
The entitlement concept is consistent with the
Supreme Court's approach to due process in other
context, but we believe the Court falters in its
emphasis on the statutory language. The Court, prior to
Greenholtz and in other contexts, recognized that
"only an unusual prisoner would be expected to think
that he was not suffering a penalty when he was denied
eligibility of parole." Warden v. Marrero, 417 U.S.
62.
(Id^ at 187).
In United States Ex Rel Johnson v. Chairman, New York
State Board of Pardons, 500 F.2d 925 (2nd Cir. 1974) the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Parole was henceforth to be treated as a
"conditional liberty" representing an "interest"
entitled to due process protection. A prisoner's
interest in prospective parole, or "conditional
entitlement" must be treated in like fashion. To hold
otherwise would be to create a distinction too
gossamer-thin to stand close analysis. Whether the
immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are
the same: conditional freedom versus incarceration.
Id. at 500. (Emphasis added).

-1 4-

Justice Powell in the Greenholtz decision also observed
why a state parole system automatically creates a liberty interest
in those that are incarcerated.

He stated:

Nothing in the Constitution requires a State to
provide for probation or parole. But when a state
adopts a parole system that applies general standards of
eligibility, prisoners justifiably expect that parole
will be granted fairly and according to law whenever
those standards are met....I am convinced that the
presence of a parole system is sufficient to create a
liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in the
parole-release decision....From the day that he is
sentenced in a state with a parole system, a prisoner
justifiably expects release on parole when he meets the
standards of eligibility applicable within that system.
Greenholtz, supra 99 S.Ct. at 2110 (Powell, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
See also, Goldsworthy v. Hannifin, 468 P.2d 350 (Nev.
1970); and New Jersey Parole Board v. Bryne, 460 A.2d 103
(N.J. 1983).
Thus, this Court in Foote recognized that a state
liberty interest clearly exists by the sentencing nature of the
Board of Pardons under the indeterminate scheme devised by the
Legislature.

Moreover, this Court impliedly recognized that

perhaps no other group of individuals can claim a more substantial
"liberty" interest than can incarcerated inmates.

In both

instances, therefore, inmates appearing before the Board of
Pardons are entitled to state due process protection.

The

arguments raised by Respondents as to whether federal or state due
process should be afforded are red herrings which detract from the
focus of this appeal, i.e., what due process protections should be
afforded?

_1 C _

POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD DECIDE AS A MATTER
OF LAW THE DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS.
Respondents argue that they are entitled to a factual hearing
in which evidence can be produced to determine the due process
rights now being addressed.

(Respondents1 Brief, 3-32).

They

assert that this Court in Foote and the Court of Appeals in
Northern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah App.
need to have an evidentiary hearing.

1991) recognize the

Parenthetically, it should

be noted that the Northern case merely quotes from the Foote
decision and therefore makes no separate statement as to the issue
now being raised by the respondents.
There are a number of reasons why the arguments made by
Respondents must fail.

The concept of prison due process of law

does not require factual hearings since procedures utilized by
prison boards throughout the country are well established and
numerous court decisions have already interpreted whether such
procedures are or are not required to comply with due process.
Thus, this Court as the highest tribunal of the state, should
decide the due process question as a matter of law in that the
concepts suggested simply do not require factual input.
Second, if this matter were remanded for a further hearing
the Board of Pardons could essentially moot the proceeding as
occurred in Foote.

Once Foote was remanded the Board of

Pardons immediately granted him parole.

As such, therefore, he

lost standing to complain about the prison parole system and the
matter was summarily dismissed upon stipulation of counsel.

This

same event could occur with petitioner Labrum.
Third, under the present statutes and regulations there is no
source of funds available to represent the petitioner or the other
inmates in conducting the full evidentiary hearing now
contemplated by the respondents.

In Foote an effort was made for

appointment of counsel under the habeas corpus provisions.

The

lower court rejected such claim and held that counsel would have
to represent Foote pro bono and essentially bear all costs of
litigation.

Thus, unless the respondents are willing to finance

the extensive hearings they claim are required— including the
production of the alleged experts necessary to make this
determination—then their arguments must be rejected on the basis
of financial burden alone.
For these reasons, therefore, the matter of due process
during parole hearings should be laid to rest once and for all by
this Court thereby allowing Respondents to litigate any claims of
undue burden in future proceedings.
POINT V
BECAUSE OF THE SUBSTANTIAL LIBERTY INTEREST
WHICH EACH INMATE HAS, THIS COURT SHOULD
REQUIRE EQUALLY SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES.
The respondents have devoted only 11 pages of their Brief to
the issue raised by this Court, i.e., "What due process rights
should be accorded an inmate at a Board of Pardons hearing?"
Respondents have only addressed the issue of attorney
representation, evidentiary hearings, and access to Board files.
(Respondents* Brief, 33-43).

They have failed to address in any

way a number of procedures discussed by these amicus curiae in

their opening Brief.

These suggested procedures include timely

notice of hearing, opportunity to properly prepare, dissemination
of criteria used by the Board of Pardons, limitation of evidence
allowable by the Board of Pardons, implementation of stringent
procedures as to matrix guidelines, and establishment of a system
of limited judicial review.

In addition, Respondents have not

addressed these amicus curiae*s claim that the procedural rights
established in this case should be applied in the future to all
inmates regardless of their presently scheduled parole hearings.
See pages 20-46 opening Brief of these amicus curiae.
Because of Respondents' failure to discuss the above issues
no further comment is required in this reply brief.

Only those

areas which are specifically discussed by Respondents will be
addressed by these amicus curiae.

As a general note, the

regulations which allegedly will go into effect in January of 1993
should have no effect upon this Court's decision concerning the
due process rights of inmates. While the effort of the Board of
Pardons is commendable, it must be kept in mind that such
amendment would not have occurred had this Court not rendered the
Foote decision.

Since regulations can come and go at the whim and

caprice of the Board of Pardons, it is essential that this Court
establish judicial principles of due process which will insure
that all future regulations contain the required procedure.
Otherwise, the regulations now being argued by the respondents
today in support of their due process claims could be repealed
next year if no judicial standards are established.
A.

Attorney Representation.
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Respondents make many untrue assertions in their argument
that attorney representation is not needed in original parole
revocation hearings.

For example, at the present time the

offender is not given a full opportunity to rebut any information
relied upon by the Board and afterwards by way of personal
correspondence with the Board.

See opening Brief of these amicus

curiae pages 27-31.
Likewise, the use of a special attention hearing or a
petition for rehearing is solely discretionary with the Board and
is only granted in exceptional cases.

Such procedures cannot be

used in place of an effective advocacy proceeding in the first
instance.
The claim that the present rule permits the Board to make
determinations of attorney representation is also erroneous.
These amicus curiae know of no instance in which an attorney has
been allowed to actively represent and participate in an original
parole hearing.

When these inflated claims of present procedure

are eliminated from Respondents1 arguments, the need for attorney
representation becomes more apparent.
Respondents claim that "an attorney in a parole grant hearing
provides little if any value in protecting an offender's interest
in the possibility of parole." (Respondents' Brief, 34). While
this statement may be true in some routine cases, it is certainly
not true in many cases.

An attorney can assist an inmate in

reviewing the file for accuracy, in refuting prejudicial or
erroneous information, and in making a formal presentation to the
Board.

Often, inmates do not have the verbal skills required to
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eloquently state the basis of their situation.
The remainder of the arguments raised by Respondents are
hardly worthy of comment.

While it may be said technically that

the Board acts in a parens patriae relationship with an offender,
the reality of the relationship is far different.

The Board has

publicly proclaimed on numerous occasions that its first interest
is to protect the public generally and the victims specifically
from any wrongful conduct that could be caused by an inmate. As
such, therefore, the interest of the prisoner is subordinate to
the other competing interests.

To state that this is similar to

an employee-employer relationship where a "supervisor strives to
better the company by improving the subordinates" is bordering on
the absurd.

(Respondents' Brief, 35). To deny that the Board of

Pardons is adversarial to the inmate is to deny realtity.
Moreover, to claim that an attorney would interfere with the
"dialogue between the offender and the decision maker" is also
equally out of reality.

Certainly judges have no difficulty in

sentencing offenders to incarceration even though the offender is
represented by an attorney during the proceeding.
The final arguments raised by Respondents would qualify as an
ad populum falacy, i.e., argument of emotion and prejudice rather
than reason.

Utilizing budget propaganda, Respondents paint a

bleak picture of attorneys depleting "the state's already limited
resources, of attorneys asking for unnecessary time delays and
clogging the overburdened calendar of the Board, and using
courtroom antics to obtain a more favorable ruling for their
client." (Respondents' Brief, 36-37).

These amicus curiae submit

that this "flood gate" argument is completely without merit.

Most

parole matters could be handled extremely expeditiously by
attorneys in preparing their client's presentation.

In many cases

they could even shorten the hearing process by eliminating
unnecessary issues before the Board.

Likewise, the Board will

have its power to regulate its own calendar just as does a court
and any abuses by attorneys can be handled administratively or
through attorney disciplinary actions.

These same arguments have

been made throughout the course of judicial history each time it
is decided that an accused, defendant, or inmate is entitled to
increased legal representation.
Finally, an "all or nothing" approach of representation is
not the only alternative.

Assuming that the inmates have proper

access to their file, attorney representation could be limited to
those instances where the inmate disputes relevant information
contained in the file or where his or her sentence will exceed the
matrix guideline established in the trial and post-trial
proceedings.

Since many inmates have pled guilty in complete

reliance upon these matrixes thereby saving the state millions of
dollars each year in trial costs, it is only proper that some
additional expense be incurred whenever these matrix guidelines
are being exceeded.
B.

Access to the Board's Files.

The heart of the Foote litigation concerned his inability to
know what accusations were being made against him by anonymous
letters contained in the file of the Board of Pardons.

Many of

these amicus curiae inmates have similar instances in which they

believe their sentences have been wrongfully extended because of
such information.

In some cases confusion of inmate names has

resulted in incorrect criminal records being charged against
parole seekers.

These amicus have previously discussed this

important right in their opening Brief.

(Amicus Curiae Brief,

22-26) .
Attached to this Brief are several letters of correspondence
between inmates and the prison administration concerning access to
files.

These documents show that inmates attempting to obtain

access to their file still face formidable obstacles in obtaining
the relevant information upon which the Board will base its
decision.

For example, even though a defendant has presumably

seen his presentence report at the time of the court-imposed
sentencing he is nevertheless denied access to this report for
review during his entire imprisonment even though such report may
be extremely pertinent to the decision by the Board.
The implementation of the new Government Records Access and
Management Act is of little assistanceto the inmates.

Section

63-2-304 provides that the following are deemed "protected
records:"
A A A

9. Records the disclosure of which would
jeopardize the life or safety of another individual;
A A A

11. Records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize
the security or safety of a correctional facility, or
records relating to incarceration, treatment, probation,
or parole, that would interfere with the control and
supervision of an offender's incarceration, treatment,
probation or parole;

12. Records that, if disclosed, would reveal
recommendations made to the Board of Pardons by an
employee of or contractor for the Department of
Corrections, the Board of Pardons, or the Department of
Humane Services that are based on the employee's or
contractor's supervision, diagnosis, or treatment of any
person within the Board's jurisdiction.
Moreover, if an inmate is to have any ability to obtain
improperly classified documents he will need many months to appeal
an adverse ruling under the appellate provision of the section.
63-2-409, et seq.

Certainly, the present seven-day notice of

hearing is totally inadequate to make any attempt to obtain
documents under this new management act.
It is respectfully suggested that the procedures urged in the
opening brief by these amicus curiae and formulated by several
courts throughout the country be adopted as the procedure for
access to inmate information.

The new access to information law

shall be used to supplement any deficiencies which may be found
to exist under the prison access system.
C,

Evidentiary Hearings.

The requirement of an evidentiary hearing is closely related
to the access of an inmate's file by the inmate or his attorney.
If, for example, the file contains no information that the inmate
opposes the need for an evidentiary hearing would be minimal. In
those cases where claimed erroneous information exists, however,
an evidentiary hearing may be essential to eliminate false
information or false accusations.

See opening Brief of these

amicus curiae pages 27-31.
Once again Respondents argue emotion rather than reason.
They contend that if additional procedures are implemented the

normal twenty-minute per case hearing time will increase thereby
decreasing the number of available hearings per year.

Respondents

contend, "As a result, the Board will be forced to limit the
number of times an inmate will be heard and/or lengthen the number
of years an inmate will have to wait prior to receiving an
original or redetermination hearing."

(Respondents1 Brief, 38).

Certainly, an inmate who may be facing a five or six year
rehearing is entitled to the fullest due process protection
available in insuring that a fair decision is made.

Part of the

present problem may well be that the twenty-minute allotment per
case is simply insufficient.

If additional time is required in

order to insure a fair hearing then it will be up to the
Legislature of this state to provide additional staff to provide
adequate hearings.

The "floodgate" argument cannot be used by

Respondents to deny inmates the opportunity of a fair hearing when
essentially their entire lives are at stake.

Just as in the case

of double-bunking and other constitutional mandated requirements,
the state is obligated to comply with judicial mandates even
though it is not a financially pleasant obligation.

Similarly,

the fact that additional attorneys may be needed to represent the
state in any type of evidentiary hearing is not a reason to deny
the existence of such hearings when necessary.
Finally, the purpose of evidentiary hearings is not to retry
the conviction of an inmate but is to insure that accurate and
reliable information is being presented to the Board in making its
parole determination.

In many instances, the false or malicious

information that is contained in the Board's file is given by

non-victims who for one motivation or another wish to keep the
inmate incarcerated.

Frequently, for example, ex-spouses, other

inmates and personal enemies are the sources of information that
the Board of Pardons relies upon in making its determination.
Since the victim is already allowed by Utah law to openly express
their feelings and since the inmate is allowed by Utah law to
respond to such expression, the requirement of an evidentiary
hearing would in very few instances have any effect on victims
themselves.
CONCLUSION
The Respondents have spent nearly three-fourths of their
Brief in arguing why the question of inmate rights during parole
hearings should not be decided by this Court.

Understandably, the

Respondents wish to avoid this Court determined question since
such avoidance will allow them to carry on business as usual.
Change is always feared—the Board of Pardons is no exception.
Just as in many instances in the past, however, change is
required under our living and dynamic constitutional system of
law.

That which was accepted in the past can no longer be

tolerated in the present.

Rights of slaves, women, workers,

minorities, handicapped are all significantly different than when
these issues were first litigated.

Likewise, the time has come to

decide what rights some 5,000 state inmates are entitled to assert
when their day of actual sentencing arrives—the parole hearing
before the Board of Pardons.
These amicus curiae inmates are grateful to have had the
opportunity to input their thinking into this extremely

significant decision.

It is hoped that this Court will provide

substantial due process procedures in the future to insure that
all inmates will be treated fairly in the parole proceedings that
govern their collective and individual fate.
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